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POWER IN LEGAL EDUCATION: A (NEW) CRITICAL AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
 
MATTHEW BALL∗ 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article explores power within legal education scholarship. It suggests that power relations 
are not effectively reflected on within this scholarship, and it provokes legal educators to 
consider power more explicitly and effectively. It then outlines in-depth a conceptual and 
methodological approach based on Michel Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’ to assist in 
such an analysis. By detailing the conceptual moves required in order to research power in legal 
education more effectively, this article seeks to stimulate new reflection and thought about the 
practice and scholarship of legal education, and allow for political interventions to become more 
ethically sensitive and potentially more effective. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
This article explores power within legal education. Power relations pervade the regime of 
practices that constitute legal education, operating in subtle but nevertheless concrete ways to 
shape the actions of students, teachers, professionals and administrators. Yet, despite their 
pervasiveness, legal education scholarship does not effectively grasp or explore power relations 
– they do not feature as objects of research in an explicit manner, and when they are considered, 
they are understood in problematic ways. This article seeks to provoke legal education scholars 
to consider and debate power more explicitly and more effectively. It offers a conceptual and 
methodological analytical approach, based on Michel Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’ 
(and drawing from Nikolas Rose and Mitchell Dean’s work extending this notion), that is 
ultimately, concerned with bringing power relations to light, and allows them to be reflected 
upon and potentially changed in an original and more nuanced way than is common within legal 
education scholarship. 
                                                          
∗ Lecturer, School of Justice, Queensland University of Technology. The author would like to thank Christian 
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The present study contributes to an ongoing project using Foucault’s work to explore specific 
problems in legal education, such as idealism within students,1 assessment practices,2 or 
depression among law students3 (adding to a wider emerging body of Foucaultian-informed legal 
education scholarship). It focuses primarily on the analytical approach and theoretical concepts 
underpinning those studies, and presents these in an extended manner, primarily so that others 
may apply their insights in a diverse range of legal education contexts. By elaborating on this 
approach and detailing the conceptual moves required in order to research power in legal 
education effectively, this article seeks to stimulate new reflection and thought about the practice 
and scholarship of legal education. 
While this article is concerned with current legal education scholarship, it does not participate 
directly within the debates that characterise the field. Instead, it offers a new way of making legal 
education intelligible and opens up new avenues of research for legal educators. The analytical 
approach it outlines will allow for overtly political interventions into legal education to become 
more effective, for pedagogical interventions to be positioned as political, and for legal educators 
to adopt new ethical sensibilities when making such interventions by recognising the possible 
dangers inherent in what they do. 
 
II POWER AND LEGAL EDUCATION SCHOLARSHIP: A TALE OF TWO DISCOURSES 
 
As mentioned above, this article suggests that legal education scholarship does not effectively 
analyse power relations – they are not conceptualized in a nuanced manner, nor are the power 
effects of legal education practices clearly articulated within analyses that otherwise examine and 
evaluate these practices. This is evinced by considering two discourses within legal education 
                                                          
1 Matthew Ball, ‘Legal Education and the “Idealistic Student”: Using Foucault to Unpack the Critical Narrative’ 
(Forthcoming) Monash University Law Review; Matthew Ball, ‘Becoming a “Bastion Against Tyranny”: Australian 
Legal Education and the Government of the Self’ (Forthcoming) Law and Critique. 
2 Matthew Ball, ‘Governmentality and the Reflection of Legal Educators: Assessment Practices as a Case Study’ 
(2010) 44 The Law Teacher, 267. 
3 Matthew Ball, ‘Governing Depression in Australian Legal Education: Power, Psychology, and Advanced Liberal 
Government’ (Forthcoming) Legal Education Review; Matthew Ball, ‘Self-Government and the Fashioning of 
Resilient Personae: Legal Education, Criminal Justice, and the Government of Mental Health’ (2011) 23 Current 
Issues in Criminal Justice, 97. 
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scholarship – critical legal scholarship, where a concern for power is present and even 
foregrounded in scholarship on legal education, and pedagogical legal scholarship, where the 
exercise of power is not clearly identified and nor is it explicitly discussed.4 
To argue that legal education scholarship does not adequately grasp power is not to suggest that 
legal educators do not seek to ensure that they and their colleagues act ethically as educators – 
such as by minimising domination over students in the teaching practices they design, reflect on, 
and report on. However, it is suggested here that to think of power as present only where 
domination exists, or where negative outcomes are produced, is an incomplete and restrictive 
perspective to take. Instead, what is necessary is for power to be understood as a social relation 
through which students, teachers, and administrators are formed, and one which is not always 
necessary. It is this view of power that is largely absent. This absence is, however, not altogether 
surprising. A number of factors, relating specifically to these critical and pedagogical legal 
education discourses, may have impacted on the largely problematic way in which power is 
understood. 
 
A Critical Scholarship 
 
Critical legal education scholarship is the first discourse considered here. Throughout much of 
the 1980s and early 1990s, critical theory was pervasive throughout legal education scholarship. 
In their engagement with legal education, critical theorists suggested that legal education acts as 
an institution that perpetuates social injustice, as it produces graduates that are more willing to 
become financially successful legal professionals than participate in radical social reform or 
work in community legal centres.5 When analysing legal education, these scholars pointed to the 
                                                          
4 For examples of recent scholarship that continues this trend, see below n20, n21, and n22. 
5 Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Critical Legal Education’ (1988-89) 5 Australian Journal of Law and Society 27 at 32; Peter 
Fitzpatrick & Alan Hunt, ‘Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction’ in Peter Fitzpatrick & Alan Hunt (eds), Critical 
Legal Studies (1987); Alan Hunt, ‘The Critique of Law: What is ‘Critical’ about Critical Legal Theory?’ in Peter 
Fitzpatrick & Alan Hunt (eds), Critical Legal Studies (1987); Ian Ward, An Introduction to Critical Legal Theory 
(2nd ed, 2004); Gerry Simpson & Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Objecting to Objectivity: The Radical Challenge to Legal 
Liberalism’ in Rosemary Hunter, Richard Ingleby, & Richard Johnstone (eds), Thinking About Law: Perspectives on 
the History, Philosophy and Sociology of Law (1995); Judy Allen & Paula Baron, ‘Buttercup Goes to Law School: 
Student Wellbeing in Stressed Law Schools’ (2004) 29 Alternative Law Journal, 285; Debra Schleef, ‘“That’s A 
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practices that act upon students and shape them as conservative legal professionals as opposed to 
politically active graduates. They highlighted the attempts made by the legal profession and other 
bodies to govern the law curriculum in accordance with the profession’s own self-interest. And 
they interrogated the effect of teaching and assessment methods on law students, designing and 
implementing political strategies to ‘liberate’ students from these power relations and any 
unwarranted government of their personae – both ‘personal’ and ‘professional’.6 
Clearly, critical theorists of legal education were centrally concerned with the existence of power 
relations within law schools. Their concern, however, was largely evaluative – the exercise of 
power was a bad thing. It was understood as a possession that was held by some – primarily the 
legal profession – and exercised over others – namely law students – in order to achieve the ends 
of those wielding it. The exercise of power was positioned as negative and repressive – as 
stifling or denying the ‘real’ interests of law students and leading to ideological indoctrination. It 
was implied that good could only come from the total removal of power relations. And finally, 
this power was assumed to operate upon an inert and passive material, with ideologies being 
deposited into the empty receptacle that is the student, and teaching and assessment practices 
working to determine the shape of the legal graduate.7 
It is little wonder that for many legal educators, these claims caused a degree of discomfort, 
leading to at times blatant denunciations of the critical enterprise.8 This was not so much caused 
by the issues that critical scholars were writing about, their ethical outlooks, or even (as may be 
posited by critical scholars) due to the investment of mainstream legal educators in these 
oppressive power relations. It may simply be due to the explanations that critical scholars 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Good Question!”: Exploring Motivations for Law and Business School Choice’ (2000) 73 Sociology of Education 
155 at 157; Margaret Thornton, Dissonance and Distrust: Women in the Legal Profession (1996) at 75-77; Mary 
Keyes & Richard Johnstone, ‘Changing Legal Education: Rhetoric, Reality, and Prospects for the Future’ (2004) 26 
Sydney Law Review 537. 
6 Ward, above n5 at 145; Simpson & Charlesworth, above n5 at 106; Thornton, above n5 at 77-78; Charlesworth, 
above n5 at 30; Allen & Baron, above n5 at 288; Keyes & Johnstone, above n5, at 540-544, 555; Alan Hunt, ‘The 
Case for Critical Legal Education’ (1986) 20 The Law Teacher 10 at 11-13. Importantly, a Foucaultian-informed 
analysis troubles the clear distinctions between personal and professional personae, as it does not posit a ‘truer’ self 
but rather understands all forms of subjectivity as produced through power relations. 
7 These assumptions have been unpacked in Ball, ‘Legal Education and the “Idealistic Student”’, above n1. 
8 Pierre Schlag, ‘U.S. CLS’ (1999) 10 Law and Critique, 199 at 204. 
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offered. As a description of what occurred in legal education, the claims that legal educators 
repressed students, turned them into conservative legal professionals, and acted in the interests of 
the legal profession appeared overstated (and could easily be denied by legal educators who did 
not have links to the profession, attempted to mitigate the influence of any ‘external’ pressures 
upon students, or sought to foster student independence and critique). There was little 
recognition of the specificity with which various techniques actually operate to produce effects 
of power; these techniques were not accounted for historically; there was no positive articulation 
of what power relations actually produced; discussions of the power that students could exercise 
or the multiple ways they could react to the exercise of power upon them were largely absent; 
and there appeared to be an orthodox view of the political actions that were acceptable and 
necessary if these forms of oppression were to be removed. In summary, the view of many legal 
educators was that grand claims were made, and they were made bluntly.9 It is this somewhat 
troubled relationship between critical legal education scholarship and other, more mainstream 
strands of legal education scholarship, which may have impacted in some way upon the absence 
of power as a concern for legal education scholarship today. 
 
B Pedagogical Scholarship 
 
Since the late 1990s, this critical scholarship has dissipated, and its pervasiveness in debates over 
legal education waned,10 with its conceptual tools considered blunt, and the claims produced 
characterised as simplistic. Pedagogically informed legal education scholarship now, perhaps 
more than ever, pervades this field of research and reflection,11 with recent surveys of the field 
attesting to the fact that pedagogical knowledge provides the common frame of reference for 
research and discussion. For example, Johnstone and Vignaendra’s ‘stocktake’ of Australian legal 
education demonstrates the extent to which pedagogical scholarship has infused legal education, 
                                                          
9 See further Ball, ‘Legal Education and the “Idealistic Student”’, above n1. 
10 See, for example, Schlag, above n8 at 204-209. 
11 This is not to suggest that critical legal scholarship has completely disappeared, or that pedagogical scholarship 
was previously absent from legal education research. Pedagogical scholarship has simply become prominent within 
the field. 
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presenting many educational practices based on this knowledge as examples of ‘best practice’.12 
Keyes and Johnstone also explicitly argue that law schools must utilise pedagogical theory to 
develop and implement teaching and learning activities and move away from the traditional 
model of legal education, which, when seen through the lens of such scholarship, does not 
provide an effective learning environment.13 Furthermore, ‘defensible pedagogy’ (such as 
fostering active learning, or constructing authentic learning environments) provides the basis for 
Kift’s environmental scan of legal education, and her discussion about the importance of 
providing both skills development and a liberal education throughout the law degree.14 A recent 
edited collection of innovation in legal education also takes pedagogical scholarship as its point 
of reference.15 And even when arguing that the implementation of pedagogically appropriate 
teaching methods has been eroded due to neoliberal reforms within legal education, Thornton 
still takes this scholarship of teaching and learning for granted as the most appropriate standard 
for evaluating legal education practices.16 
While pedagogical scholarship is often concerned with similar issues to critical scholarship – the 
effect of legal education practices (such as doctrinal classrooms, closed book exams, and 
uncritical or unreflective curricula) on the student, and the negative experience of many law 
students throughout their degrees, for instance17 – no other understanding of power has been 
                                                          
12 Richard Johnstone & Sumitra Vignaendra, Learning Outcomes and Curriculum Development in Law: A Report 
Commissioned by the Australian Universities Teaching Committee (2003) Australian Universities Teaching 
Committee <http://www.autc.gov.au/projects/completed/loutcomes_law/split_pdf.htm> at 15 January 2007. 
13 Keyes & Johnston, above n5 at 538, 545-547, 551-554. 
14 Sally Kift, ‘21st Century Climate for Change: Curriculum Design for Quality Learning Engagement in Law’ 
(2008) 18 Legal Education Review 1 at 6. 
15 Sally Kift, Michelle Sanson, Jill Cowley, & Penelope Watson (eds), Excellence and Innovation in Legal 
Education (2011). 
16 Margaret Thornton, ‘The Idea of the University and the Contemporary Legal Academy’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law 
Review 481 at 486-487. For a further discussion of the spread of pedagogical discourses through legal education, see 
Nickolas James, ‘The Good Law Teacher: The Propagation of Pedagogicalism in Australian Legal Education’ 
(2004) 27 University of New South Wales Law Journal 147. 
17 See the extensive documentation of this in Johnstone & Vignaendra, above n12. Also see Kift, above n14 at 21-
26. Another example is the increasing concern of Australian legal educators over the issue of student depression. See 
Norm Kelk, Georgina Luscombe, Sharon Medlow & Ian Hickie, Courting the Blues: Attitudes Towards Depression 
in Australian Law Students and Lawyers (2009) Brain and Mind Research Institute 
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articulated to replace the critical understanding. This is not to suggest that legal education 
scholarship is no longer concerned with power. Scholars primarily report on the details and 
specifics of a particular kind of legal education practice – a teaching method, mode of 
assessment, class activity – and evaluate its effectiveness, pointing to the conditions under which 
it can successfully be implemented, and highlighting the barriers that may prevent its success, 
hoping to make the experience of law students a positive one. However, in the analyses 
undertaken, power as a specific and explicit object of reflection is absent – it is not overtly 
reflected upon, nor is it considered to be a significant aspect of these practices.18 
Within such analyses, power as a specific and explicit object of reflection is absent. While 
scholars may reflect on the impact of these practices on the student, and question whether the 
effects of that practice are appropriate, power itself – its material effects, the modes of its 
exercise, the points of resistance to it, and its unintended consequences – are not highlighted. 
Despite the significant power effects that these practices might have – they are seen as somehow 
neutral and absent of power. While this may be because they do not appear to be imposing 
anything upon the student overtly – they represent themselves as simply technical practices 
designed to effectively teach students, or address problems like depression, and nothing more – 
this is a restricted view of power. Thus, while large, blunt claims about power are no longer 
really made within this body of scholarship, small, sharp claims appear to be attempted only 
rarely.19 
It is possible to identify three assumptions that could be said to underpin pedagogical 
scholarship, and which effectively render power invisible in many pedagogically-informed 
analyses. Identifying these assumptions offers a possible way of thinking about pedagogical 
scholarship. The first is that of neutrality and beneficence. The reflections on, and evaluation of, 
legal education practices often assume that these interventions are not invested with power 
relations primarily because they are underpinned by pedagogical discourses. There is therefore 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
<http://cald.anu.edu.au/docs/Law%20Report%20Website%20version%204%20May%2009.pdf> accessed 14 
October 2011. 
18 See below for a discussion of the assumptions about power and legal education that suggest how the issue of 
power becomes sidelined in legal education scholarship. 
19 For some examples, see Thornton, above n5; James, above n16; Nickolas James, ‘Power-Knowledge in Australian 
Legal Education: Corporatism’s Reign’ (2004) 40 Sydney Law Review 587. 
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no ulterior motive to their existence or implementation beyond doing good for students – 
improving their experience of legal education, for example.20 The second assumption is that of 
progression. It appears to be implied that legal education practices and scholarship are 
progressing inexorably towards a point at which ‘best practice’ will have been achieved. It is held 
that ongoing research, the continued use of these tools, and the reliance on pedagogical 
discourses, will inevitably lead to the best way of knowing how students learn and study, and 
how they engage with their education. The knowledge bank, so to speak, offering the most 
accurate or apparently scientific knowledge about learning and teaching, is progressively built 
                                                          
20 For recent examples of this in a variety of contexts within legal education scholarship – such as utilising online 
exams and other technologies to assist with student learning, enhancing student reflection and their deep and 
experiential learning for professional practice, strengthening the emotional resilience and independence of students, 
addressing attrition and disengagement, and teaching values and ethics to students – see Andrew Hemming, ‘Online 
Tests and Exams: Lower Standards or Improved Learning?’ (2010) 44 The Law Teacher, 283; Mihail Danov, 
‘Teaching International Commercial Arbitration at Postgraduate Level: Techniques for Enhancing Students’ 
Learning’ (2011) 45 The Law Teacher, 101; Mary-Rose Russell, ‘Reflections on Learning: Students’ Insights on 
Their Learning in a Legal Research Skills Course in the Core Curriculum’ (2011) 45 The Law Teacher, 45; Fiona 
Martin, Kate Collier & Shirley Carlon, ‘Mentoring First-Year Distance Education Students in Taxation Studies’ 
(2009) 19 Legal Education Review, 217; Kelley Burton & Judith McNamara, ‘Assessing Reflection Skills in Law 
Using Criterion Referenced Assessment’ (2009) 19 Legal Education Review, 172; Bobette Wolski, ‘Beyond 
Mooting: Designing an Advocacy, Ethics and Values Matrix for the Law School Curriculum’ (2009) 19 Legal 
Education Review, 41; Sarah Field & Lucy Jones, ‘Innovations in Assessment: An Investigation Into the Role of 
Blended Learning as a Support Mechanism for Assessment’ (2010) 44 The Law Teacher, 378; Lisa Claydon, 
‘Engaging and Motivating Students: Assessment to Aid Student Learning on a First Year Core Module’ (2009) 43 
The Law Teacher, 269; Edward Phillips, Sandra Clarke, Sarah Crofts & Angela Laycock, ‘Exceeding the 
Boundaries of Formulaic Assesment: Innovation and Creativity in the Law School’ (2010) 44 The Law Teacher, 
334; Dawn Watkins, ‘The Role of Narratives in Legal Education’ (2011) 32 Liverpool Law Review, 113; Sandra 
Clarke, ‘Peer Interaction and Engagement Through Online Discussion Forums: A Cautionary Tale’ (2011) 32 
Liverpool Law Review, 149; Cherry James, ‘A New Programme for a New LLB: An Initial Evaluation’ (2011) 32 
Liverpool Law Review, 165; Tom Serby, ‘Learning Through Simulation, and Its Potential for Deeper Learning in 
Higher Education’ (2011) 32 Liverpool Law Review, 181. Many of these authors articulate the links between 
pedagogical and psychological knowledges and the practices that they are discussing. Of course, this is not to 
suggest that all instances of legal education scholarship engage with pedagogy or psychology in the same manner, or 
even in the most effective manner, but their evocation of these knowledges is important to note. 
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upon, and then drawn from when implementing new approaches.21 The final assumption relates 
to the technical and evaluative nature of these discourses, already alluded to above, where legal 
education scholars detail the design, implementation, and evaluation of teaching methods. This is 
underpinned by the apparent suggestion that it is somewhat necessary for students to be 
governed in particular ways – for their mental health, generic professional skills, or moral values 
to be legitimate concerns of legal educators, for example – and that it is the role of the legal 
educator to participate in the development and deployment of these forms of government.22 
If power is to be more fully conceptualised in legal education, these assumptions must be 
confronted. Assuming that a particular approach to teaching law is always beneficial and neutral 
                                                          
21 The assumption of progression is apparent in many recent articles, given that many such articles position one 
particular practice or approach as problematic and then outline solutions drawn from what is argued to be a deeper 
engagement with pedagogical or psychological discourses. Note this occurring in the discussions of: online exams 
and other technologies to assist learning (Hemming, above n20; Field and Jones, above n20); producing reflective 
practitioners (Russell, above n20); fostering deep learning (Paula Baron, ‘Deep and Surface Learning: Can Teachers 
Really Control Student Approaches to Learning in Law?’ (2002) 45 The Law Teacher, 123); and implementing 
experiential learning (Phillips, Clarke, Crofts & Laycock, above n20). 
22 Recent legal education scholarship is replete with technical and evaluative discussions about: teaching and 
assessment methods used to achieve a variety of goals (Danov, above n20; Burton & McNamara, above n20; Baron, 
above n21; Sarah Mercer, Christopher Rogers & Clare Sandford-Couch, ‘Teaching Dissent in the Law School: Have 
Students Learned to Disagree?’ (2011) 32 Liverpool Law Review, 135; Elspeth Berry, ‘Group Work and 
Assessment: Benefit or Burden?’ (2007) 41 The Law Teacher, 19); the use of virtual technologies for a variety of 
teaching tasks (Hemming, above n20; Jennifer Yule, Judith McNamara & Mark Thomas, ‘Mooting and Technology: 
To What Extent Does Using Technology Improve the Mooting Experience for Students?’ (2010) 20 Legal 
Education Review, 137); the management of transitions into and out of the degree, first year initiatives, and 
authentic assessment (James, above n20; Amanda Stickley, ‘Providing a Law Degree for the “Real World”: 
Perspective of an Australian Law School’ (2011) 45 The Law Teacher, 63); raising student performance and 
responding to external demands (Phillips, Clarke, Crofts & Laycock, above n20); ensuring the development of 
emotional engagement (Serby, above n20); addressing the attrition and non-engagement of students (Clarke, above 
n20); and developing student skills (Clair Hughes, ‘The Modification of Assessment Task Dimensions in Support of 
Student Progression in Legal Skills Development’ (2009) 19 Legal Education Review, 133). The assumption that 
government in these contexts is necessary is also suggested in the way these articles often present methods for 
overcoming competing interests likely to be encountered (Clarke, above n20; Martin, Collier & Carlon, above n20), 
and the rubrics, tables and diagrams that are scattered throughout, as these seek to assist legal educators in their 
translation of these designs into other contexts (discussed further below). These documents of the activities of those 
acting within legal education can serve as useful sources of information about how these actors govern. 
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can hide any potential dangers that it might entail; the idea of progress cannot necessarily be 
used to characterise the story of legal education scholarship or act as a tool with which to 
evaluate it; and a technical and evaluative approach for legal education scholarship puts to the 
side an examination of the significant investment that these practices have within regimes of 
power, thereby sacrificing for the legal education scholar (in many cases) some extensive ethical 
reflection for a technical role in the administration of legal education. Unpacking these 
assumptions brings to light the necessity of a new way of thinking about this, which, it is 
suggested, is what governmentality offers. 
 
1 Challenging Assumptions 
 
First, to rethink the assumption that legal education interventions are neutral and beneficent, two 
important points must be made – that governmental interventions do not express the values that 
they suggest underpin them, and that pointing out the existence of power relations in these 
contexts does not constitute a value judgment of these activities, but nor does this mean adopting 
a neutral stance on them. While many attempts to reform and reshape legal education are 
justified by those proposing them because they will offer students greater freedom of choice in a 
job market, will respect students’ inherent skills or capabilities as individual learners, or will help 
strengthen their emotional resilience and enhance their wellbeing, it is important to examine how 
these values (freedom, choice, rights, wellbeing) function within the rhetoric of government.23 
Allying a particular program or reform to one of these values has the effect of producing greater 
support for them. Thus, one must be careful not to suggest that these governmental practices 
actually express the particular values that are said to underpin them.24 Such values are embroiled 
within the discourses that rationalise particular types of government, and thus, how these values 
function within these forms of rationalisation must be understood. While these values might 
inform the way that relations of power are arranged and organized, they should not be relied 
                                                          
23 See for example Ball, above n2; Ball, above n3; Matthew Ball, ‘The Construction of the Legal Identity: 
“Governmentality” in Australian Legal Education’ (2007) 7 QUT Law and Justice Journal, 444. 
24 Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (2010, 2nd edition) at 45-46. 
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upon to shed light on the ‘origin’ or basis of forms of government, nor be used to evaluate that 
government.25 
Furthermore, legal education interventions should not be understood as neutral and beneficent – 
if they are thoroughly invested in power, they are potentially dangerous. This is not to suggest 
that this is necessarily always a bad thing – in fact, it is to suggest that we are unable to 
determine whether a practice is inherently good or bad. We ought to eschew critique, aimed at 
opposing and denouncing power and suggesting ‘more appropriate’ forms of government (as both 
critical and pedagogical scholars have previously done), and instead opt for a practice of 
criticism,26 which can be useful and empowering in itself, as it brings to light the costs of 
governing in a particular way, disturbs the taken-for-granted, promotes considered and ethical 
reflection on government, allows for new and creative solutions to develop, encourages people to 
take responsibility for their role within relations of government, and allows them to see social 
arrangements as more contingent than they previously saw them.27 Understanding legal 
education interventions as simply beneficent and neutral can result in one glossing over the 
various impacts of power here. 
Second, the assumption that legal education is progressive must be questioned. While it is not 
completely necessary to reject the idea of progression out of hand, it is necessary, in line with 
Foucault’s work at least, to suspend judgment on such normative issues. Progression implies a 
moral evaluation that particular practices are preferable and more developed, and others less 
preferable and less developed. That which is seen as ‘progressive’ is granted a powerful position, 
while those positioned in opposition to this are automatically less privileged. Further, it is 
assumed that this process of development is easily identifiable, and it ultimately becomes a 
method for judging other practices. In the case of pedagogical scholarship, this would suggest 
                                                          
25 Ibid. 
26 Dean defines the activity of criticism (as undertaken within an analytics of government) as a ‘…restive 
interrogation of what is taken as given, natural, necessary and neutral’, and contrasts this with the activity of critique 
(generally undertaken within critical scholarship), which is an analysis ‘…conducted under universal norms and 
truths and pointing towards a necessary end’. See further Dean, above n24 at 3-4. 
27 Michel Foucault, ‘Questions of Method’ in James Faubion (ed), Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984: 
Volume 3 (2000) 223 at 234-235; Dean, above n24 at 48; Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political 
Thought (1999) at 59. 
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that by increasing the use of pedagogical discourses in the development and design of various 
legal education interventions, we are moving from bad to good.28 It also assumes that a particular 
discourse offers the neutral tools with which to evaluate practices. However, as discourses are 
inevitably bound with power, and numerous historical contingencies have led to their being 
positioned as true,29 there is no historical basis for the idea that any discourse can offer the 
neutral reference point from which to evaluate government and suggest that some are negative 
and less developed while others are positive and more developed. These moral evaluations are a 
common feature of both critical and pedagogical discussions about legal education. For example, 
critical legal analyses usually imply that some relations are negative and ought to be altered to 
become ‘good’ – they are often aimed at liberating a human nature that has somehow been 
repressed.30 Within pedagogical analyses, relations of government are not judged using overtly 
moral criteria, but these judgments are couched in a more neutral manner. That is, they are 
evaluated on the basis of whether or not they contribute in appropriate ways to a student’s 
educational development as a learner and person. In either case, assumptions are made about 
what constitute ‘good’ changes to practices with ‘negative’ effects, and these must be analysed as 
forms of power, which, to be effective, necessitates a suspension of normative assumptions. 
Finally, the technical and evaluative nature of legal education, and the concomitant assumption 
that government is necessary, must also be questioned. As Dean suggests, to understand 
government and power, we must ‘…eschew any position that claims that all the activity of 
governing is bad or good, necessary or unnecessary’, and nor should we seek to understand how 
people may ‘…be liberated from or, indeed, by government’.31 We must also refuse to suggest 
what practices of government are right and wrong, or which ones ought to be fought against or 
altered. These technical and evaluative debates about legal education are inextricably bound with 
power relations and, if power is to be fully understood, should not be thought about from the 
same positions of, or using the same tools as, critical or pedagogical scholars. No analysis 
informed by governmentality can spell out in detail which practices to alter. 
                                                          
28 See Ball, above n2 at 268. 
29 See James, above n16. 
30 Dean, above n24 at 47. 
31 Ibid at 46 [emphases added]. 
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To summarise these ideas in two points, one could suggest that within legal education 
scholarship, power is understood as a negative thing to be critiqued and which finds its 
expression in repression, and that power is considered as absent from ‘beneficial’ knowledges – 
pedagogical discourses, for example, appear as objective and, in their quasi-scientific objectivity, 
are largely removed from the exercise of power. If power is to be considered in a different way, 
then it is a necessary conceptual move to think about power as involving the productive shaping 
of conduct, and to understand knowledge and power as interrelated. On these two points, more 
must be said. 
One of the biggest contributions of Foucault’s work, and one which directly feeds into an 
analytics of government, is the shift away from an understanding of power that focuses on it as 
necessarily and inherently bad. Foucault suggested that power can be understood as a productive 
social relationship. In Foucault’s formulation, it refers to the ‘conduct of conducts’, which need 
not imply something negative or repressive.32 While all forms of power may be potentially 
dangerous, they can also be positive – they produce ways of acting, knowing, and, importantly, 
being. Power is not held by some and denied to others. Instead, it is a social relationship that 
produces particular kinds of personae amongst those through whom it circulates.33 Of course, 
this is not to laud power relations, but rather to acknowledge that power relations are more 
complex than often assumed. 
Related to this is the move away from seeing any connection between power and knowledge as 
negative. It is often assumed that if the production of knowledge appears to be too closely related 
to power relations, then that knowledge is tainted or partial – if it is to be accurate, knowledge 
has to be free of any ‘interests’.34 It is the close connection between the political ‘interests’ of 
critical scholars and the outcomes of their analyses that contribute perhaps to a wider discomfort 
with their analyses. In contrast, it is the apparent disinterest and the quasi-scientific nature of the 
                                                          
32 Michel Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’ in James Faubion (ed), Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-
1984: Volume 3 (2000) 326 at 341. 
33 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality Volume 1 (1998) at 82-85 and 136; Michel 
Foucault, ‘Power Affects the Body’ in Sylvère Lotringer (ed), Foucault Live: Collected Interviews, 1961-1984 
(1996) 207 at 207-210. 
34 Michel Foucault, ‘Truth and Power’ in Colin Gordon (ed), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings 1972–1977 (1980) 109 at 131. 
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analyses of pedagogical scholars that may justify their wide uptake. Moreover, in many critical 
analyses the achievement or maintenance of the privileged state of the ‘powerful’ is understood 
as relying on the control over knowledge – critical scholars pointing to the indoctrination of 
populations through ideologies are expressing this idea.35 However, power and knowledge can 
be thought about more effectively if they are understood as linked in positive (and again 
productive) ways. Power functions through particular knowledges – pedagogical knowledge 
being a clear example, as it is used to design and implement strategies to ‘conduct the conduct’ of 
students in a class, for instance – and the exercise of power produces new forms of knowledge – 
evaluations of a particular practice allow one to make alterations to that practice that inevitably 
effect the ways that power operates.36 Both of these points are fundamental to the analytical 
approach outlined below, and essential if power is to be more effectively understood in legal 
education. 
 
III GOVERNMENTALITY AND AN ANALYTICS OF GOVERNMENT 
 
The analytical approach outlined here, termed an ‘analytics of government’, has developed from 
Michel Foucault’s work on ‘governmentality’. Foucault developed this term to refer to studies 
into the design and implementation of forms of government in a variety of contexts.37 The term 
joins the notions of government and rationality, and was used by Foucault to bring together his 
work on power and knowledge and use them to analyse power relations. Drawing from his work 
on the interaction between power and knowledge (or power-knowledge as he occasionally 
termed it), governmentality recognises that some form of rationality or body of knowledge 
underpins the act of governing – government is never simply arbitrary or uninformed – and that 
                                                          
35 See, for example, Duncan Kennedy, ‘Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy’ (1982) 32 Journal of 
Legal Education 591; Hunt, above n6 at 11–13; Keyes & Johnstone, above n5 at 540. 
36 See generally, Foucault, above n34; Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1991) at 
251 and 254; Michel Foucault, ‘Prison Talk’ in Colin Gordon (ed), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and 
Other Writings 1972–1977 (1980) 37 at 52. 
37 Foucault, above n32 at 341; Dean, above n24 at 24-28; Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures 
at the Collège de France 1977-1978 (2007) at 87-114; Michel Foucault, ‘The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a 
Practice of Freedom’ in Paul Rabinow (ed), Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984: 
Volume 1 (2000) 281 at 300. 
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there is a systematic manner of thinking about, knowing, arranging, establishing relations 
between, and designing methods to intervene upon that which is to be governed.38 The term 
rationality here is used in the ‘instrumental’ sense of rationale, and not in the sense of a universal 
or transcendental rationality.39 Using Foucault’s work on power relations more generally, 
governmentality also considers the practices that are utilised in achieving the government of 
conduct, including both those practices that act on people, and those that people employ to shape 
their own conduct.40 Legal education is one such site where government is rationalised and 
practised in specific ways. These concepts of rationalities and practices form useful 
methodological signposts with which to analyse legal education and, ultimately, to analyse 
power more effectively so that the above assumptions may be pushed past.41 
 
A Governmental Rationalities 
 
The first methodological signpost of an analytics of government involves the identification of 
governmental rationalities that offer a coherent thought process forming the basis of attempts to 
govern. Governmental rationalities in this context refer to  
the changing discursive fields within which the exercise of power is conceptualised, the moral 
justifications for particular ways of exercising power by diverse authorities, notions of the 
appropriate forms, objects and limits of politics, and conceptions of the proper distribution of such 
tasks among secular, spiritual, military and familial sectors.42 
Analysing these rationalities allows one to: identify how particular concepts are problematised as 
objects requiring government; examine the forms of knowledge that establish the basis for 
                                                          
38 Peter Miller & Nikolas Rose, Governing the Present: Administering Economic, Social, and Personal Life (2008) 
at 15-16; Nikolas Rose & Peter Miller, ‘Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government’ (1992) 43 
The British Journal of Sociology 173 at 175; Dean, above n24 at 42-43. 
39 Foucault, above n27 at 229. 
40 Michel Foucault, ‘Technologies of the Self’ in Paul Rabinow (ed), Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth: Essential Works 
of Foucault 1954-1984: Volume 1 (2000) 223 at 225; Rose & Miller, above n38 at 173. 
41 It must be noted that the following section canvasses the general approach of scholars using the concept of 
governmentality, and can only serve as an introduction to this field of research. It offers concepts that can be used as 
‘signposts’, allowing one to get a general direction within the field. Those seeking to take up these concepts further 
are encouraged to engage more deeply with the work of Foucault and others who have developed these ideas. 
42 Rose & Miller, above n38 at 175. 
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governmental activity; articulate the moral justifications that are established to underpin 
government; and elucidate the boundaries that these rationalities place upon governing authorities 
(in terms of their legitimate powers, the restrictions imposed upon them, and the appropriate 
methods through which government can be effected).43 Rationalities not only define the objects to 
be governed, but also outline the way they might be governed – that is, the appropriate methods 
to be used, the limits that must be respected, and the way different activities can be linked. In this 
process, these rationalities ‘make up’ various ‘governable spaces’ (such as the population, the 
economy, the law classroom, or individual law students).44 
An example can serve to illustrate this. Consider the strong push within diverse educational 
endeavours to construct ‘learning environments’ for students. These attempts rely on particular 
ways of rationalising government – that is, of understanding the appropriate ways in which 
practices can be arranged, tasks distributed, and responsibilities defined. In this case, practices are 
arranged in order to provide ‘learning environments’ (as opposed to teaching environments), 
teachers are to ‘facilitate’ student learning, and students are to become active and responsible in 
this process.45 Or, as another example, initiatives to ensure that students become skilled and 
ethical graduates rely on the identification (through governmental rationalities) of certain objects 
– in this case the student’s skills capabilities and ethical frameworks – as targets of government.46 
Whether seeking to create a skilled lawyer, ‘desirable’ graduate, or an agent of social and legal 
change, law schools rationalise government in various ways so as to define the appropriate targets 
that may be governed, the limits that constrain government, and the appropriate forms of that 
rule. In this sense, the way that students are governed is directed, planned, and coordinated in 
numerous ways and to a range of ends, which do not originate exclusively in the most prestigious 
law firms, nor solely in the heads of pedagogically informed scholars, because they depend on the 
circulation of a variety of discourses. Looking at rationalities in this manner allows power to be 
                                                          
43 Mitchell Dean, Critical and Effective Histories: Foucault’s Methods and Historical Sociology (1994) at 187; 
Miller & Rose, above n38 at 15-16. 
44 Rose, above n27 at 31-33; see also Miller & Rose, above n38 at 15. 
45 See for example, Kift, above n14 at 21-26; Johnstone & Vignaendra, above n12 at 291-319. 
46 Ball, above n23 at 451-456; Kift, above n14 at 10-16, 26-30; Johnstone & Vignaendra, above n12 at 117-123, 
133-166. 
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understood as consisting partly of a regime of thought in which the activity of governing is 
calculated in specific and mundane ways. 
With regard to legal education, governmental rationalities can be identified perhaps most clearly 
within the texts that circulate in this context – journal articles, theoretical expositions, 
evaluations, strategic documents, unit outlines, graduate capabilities frameworks, and policies 
seeking to direct teaching and assessment practices, to name a few. What makes their 
identification more than simply a description of the way that government is designed and 
arranged is the important point that the truths through which we understand the world and how 
we are to act within and upon it (such as pedagogy, psychology, sociology, or criminology), as 
well as the objects of our knowledge (such as aspects of our world like the ‘economy’ or 
‘society’, or aspects of our self such as our ‘sexuality’) are historically constructed. These 
knowledges, Foucault urges throughout his work, induce effects of power by offering apparently 
authoritative ways of understanding human beings. Because of their historical construction, no 
single body of knowledge can claim to represent ‘The Truth’.47 This means that all of the texts 
examined in this context must be placed ‘at the same level’ – none should be privileged as 
offering a deeper or more accurate understanding of legal education – because all are formed by 
the variety of discourses drawn from the same discursive field, and none have privileged access 
to the truth.48 Once we recognize these points, it is possible to conceive of these rationalities as 
bound with power relations and producing effects in the real, as opposed to simply reflecting the 
real. 
Rationalities of government draw from these bodies of knowledge, as it is through them that one 
can identify the way that a field of objects is rendered ‘visible’ and made ‘intelligible’. It is on the 
basis of these forms of visibility and intelligibility that government proceeds.49 As Foucault 
recognises, these knowledges and their vocabularies are ‘…an element of government itself’, in 
that they function ‘…as a “politics of truth”, producing new forms of knowledge, inventing new 
                                                          
47 See generally Michel Foucault, History of Madness (2006); Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An 
Archaeology of Medical Perception (2003); Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (2002); Michel 
Foucault, The Order of Things (2002). 
48 Of course, this applies to the discourses presented here, and the truth claims that this article makes. However, this 
article is simply suggesting one possible way of understanding legal education and legal education scholarship. 
49 Rose, above n27 at 28; see also Miller & Rose, above n38 at 15-16. 
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notions and concepts that contribute to the “government” of new domains of regulation and 
intervention’ – they are not neutral representations of reality.50 How law students are represented 
or ‘pictured’ in the minds of administrators, course designers, and teachers is therefore always 
partial, and has an effect on the techniques selected to govern, how these techniques will be 
arranged, what problems government is to solve, and the ends to which government is turned.51 
For example, if students are made visible as customers, then law schools may understand their 
role as providing an educational product, and attempt to create ‘authentic’ learning environments 
from which students can gain a direct benefit when moving into legal practice.52 Again, these are 
not ‘real’ or ‘inherent’ properties of students, but rather ways of visualising and constructing the 
realms and relations to be governed. 
These representations of students also have effects on the aspects of legal education that are 
called into question by teachers, law school administrators, or even students – that is, on what is 
problematised.53 For example, when law schools seek to focus on ‘what lawyers need to be able 
to do’ instead of ‘what lawyers need to know’,54 the skills of law students are being 
problematised so as to become a target of government. Or, when it is suggested ‘[t]hat law 
schools examine the adequacy of their attention to theoretical and critical perspectives’,55 the 
                                                          
50 Thomas Lemke, Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique (2000) at [8] 
<http://www.thomaslemkeweb.de/publikationen/Foucault,%20Governmentality,%20and%20Critique%20IV-2.pdf> 
accessed 14 October 2011. Consider some terms that circulate within this scholarship – ‘whole of curriculum 
design’, ‘graduate attributes’, ‘transition pedagogy’, ‘first-year experience’, ‘engagement’, ‘blended environments’, 
‘resilience’, or ‘standards’. None is simply a descriptive term. Rather, each calls to mind an attitude towards the 
design of practices, a disposition within educators regarding how they ought to act on and interact with students in a 
classroom, and a specific idiom through which these practices and dispositions can be articulated. This becomes 
most apparent if one listens to those on university or faculty committees when speaking of curriculum matters. 
51 Dean, above n24 at 41. 
52 Examples of such techniques and practices can include e-Portfolios, Work Integrated Learning, Clinical Legal 
Education, or the embedding of mooting activities in law school curricula. 
53 Dean, above n24 at 38. 
54 Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice System (2009). 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/89/> accessed 10 July 2011. 
55 Dennis Pearce, Enid Campbell, & Don Harding, Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the 
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission (A Summary) (1987) Australian Government Publishing Service, at 
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multidisciplinary knowledge that students hold is being problematised, subsequently becoming a 
target of government. These new ‘problems’ to be governed spawn the development or 
reformulation of numerous mechanisms through which this government is achieved, such as 
techniques to assess a student’s competencies in these areas, as well as new research reflecting 
on and suggesting how this might be achieved.56 By considering that which has been 
problematised, one can identify the points at which various attempts to govern have been 
designed, and these can subsequently be understood as attempts to govern, and not overlooked as 
apparently objective or neutral attempts to simply teach or to address ‘gaps’ in legal education 
that need filling. 
Rationalities of government themselves do not govern people, and nor are they ever directly 
transferred into practice. Rather, they are translated into technical and practical plans and 
programs that may then be implemented to shape the conduct of an individual or group. The 
design of these programs requires the incorporation of various kinds of intellectual machinery 
(such as pedagogical theories of teaching and learning).57 Existing practices are rearranged in 
new assemblages, oriented towards achieving new ends – that is, the various ‘intellectual, social, 
and material’ resources available at hand are turned to different ends according to these programs, 
primarily because these already ‘do the job’ of achieving specific tasks.58 In the context of legal 
education, consider programs such as student mooting competitions, graduate capabilities 
frameworks, legal clinics, assessment design and attempts at constructive alignment, and even 
‘first-year experience’ initiatives, all of which seek to arrange and rearrange the practices of legal 
education so as to achieve particular goals and shape conduct in desirable ways. Despite subtle 
nuances between them and the ends they seek to achieve – whether competently skilled 
professionals, graduates with a social conscience, or even good students – they are similar in that 
they work on a limited range of targets (such as legal skills, ethical viewpoints, or legal 
knowledge), hope to utilise a certain range of techniques, harness bodies of knowledge in 
                                                          
56 Dean, above n24 at 38. 
57 Foucault, above n27 at 231-232; Miller & Rose, above n38 at 15-16; Rose & Miller, above n38 at 181-182; Dean, 
above n24 at 32. 
58 Pat O’Malley, ‘Genealogy, Systematisation, and Resistance in “Advanced Liberalism”’ in Gary Wickham & 
George Pavlich (eds) Rethinking Law, Society, and Governance: Foucault’s Bequest (2001) 13 at 14. 
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governing, and attempt to arrange practices so as to shape the forms of legal personae produced 
through legal education.59 
It is important to note the translation required in these activities. Programs rarely, if at all, involve 
the introduction of entirely new practices into legal education. In fact, they primarily seek to 
rearrange the multitude of existing practices of legal education and reprogram them to achieve 
new ends. They cannot act as though they were coherent and fully functioning designs, and 
certainly cannot implement the will of their ‘designers’ unproblematically within law schools (as 
critical scholars might suggest when they chart a direct line from the designs of particular groups 
to the operation of power). Interventions based on pedagogical scholarship, for example, can only 
be successful to the extent that the programs designed can effectively harness the limited and 
often competing resources made available to educators. Even then, they are only successful 
insofar as other contingencies – such as the extent to which students are invested within a 
program – will also allow. Actors must be enrolled in these programs by aligning their own goals 
with what these programs seek to achieve. The basis of these programs in pedagogical 
scholarship does not guarantee their successful implementation in and of itself – the investment 
of others and the harnessing of diverse actors and practices is always necessary. 
 
B Governmental Practices 
 
While rationalities are concerned with the discursive regimes in which questions of government 
are posed and explicit attempts to shape conduct designed, it is also necessary to examine the 
actual practices and technical machinery used to achieve this government and shape conduct. The 
practices utilised to govern form the second methodological signpost for an analytics of 
government. These practices include the ‘…means, mechanisms, procedures, instruments, tactics, 
techniques, technologies and vocabularies’ through which government is achieved.60 In 
undertaking such an analysis, we must be conscious of the impacts that these practices have on 
                                                          
59 Ball, above n23 at 451-456. 
60 Dean, above n24 at 42; Miller & Rose, above n38 at 15-16. Dean warns that rationalities and technologies of 
government (that is the bodies of ‘know-how’ used to govern) must not be considered as ‘mental’ and ‘manual’ 
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shaping the conduct of persons, and also point to the ‘congenitally failing’ nature of their 
operation.61 
The variety of different programs operating within legal education, and the numerous rationalities 
that underpin these programs, might imply that there is similar diversity in the techniques through 
which they are implemented. However, this is not necessarily the case. Whether it is within 
general classroom teaching, mooting competitions, or legal clinics, and whether they intend to 
offer students specific forms of professional training or produce reflective, critical, or socially 
just lawyers, these programs rely on the assemblage of a number of similar techniques – in many 
cases, forms of classroom instruction and training, assessment tasks, and practices in which self-
reflection and self-government are encouraged. Furthermore, the design and implementation of 
these techniques is almost always underpinned by similar bodies of technical ‘know-how’ that are 
used to exercise power – pedagogical knowledges and corporatist or ‘market’ discourses are the 
most prominent ones assembled here. They provide ‘true’ representations of students (as active 
learners and as customers of legal education), on the basis of which programs can be designed (to 
provide learning environments that are authentic and equip students for later employment) and 
appropriate techniques of government selected (that allow them to actively learn by ‘doing’ what 
would be required of them in the employment context).62 Their technical character positions them 
as somewhat distinct from rationalities of government, though they can overlap (pedagogical 
discourses, for example, can be drawn from in the shaping of governmental rationalities, while 
they can also provide the technical know-how to govern). 
Beyond the classroom, techniques such as ‘…systems of accounting, methods of the organisation 
of work, forms of surveillance, [and] methods of timing and spacing of activities in particular 
locales’ are further relied on to administer legal education. In other contexts, this ‘know-how’ can 
include ‘…types of schooling and medical practice, systems of income support, forms of 
administration and “corporate management”, systems of intervention into various organisations, 
and bodies of expertise’, and can take the form of reports, graphs, statistics, charts, and diagrams 
                                                          
61 Rose & Miller, above n38 at 190. 
62 See, generally, Ball, above n23; James, above n16; Kift, above n14; Johnstone & Vignaendra, above n12. 
22 
 
– anything that allows the objects, persons, and relations that are to be governed to be represented 
and known.63 
These various techniques are also adopted within the management of law schools. Corporatist 
discourses offer law school administrators many of the intellectual tools through which 
government within the law school may be administered. These intellectual tools include the 
language and practices of budgeting, accounting, and performance measurement. They also 
define the appropriate standards against which the operation of programs and activities of staff 
members can be assessed, and their successes or failures determined.64 
It is necessary, when analysing this technical machinery of power, to simply adopt the ‘flat and 
empirical’65 task of asking ‘how’ questions about power (‘how do we govern?’), and not ‘why’ 
questions (‘why do those in power seek to shape people’s actions in this way?’, or ‘why do 
students become cynical about the ability of the law to achieve social change?’).66 Doing so not 
only avoids the determinism of traditional proprietary and conspiratorial accounts of power 
(where power is held by one group and exercised in a negative way over another), but also 
produces a much more extensive view of power relations.67 It avoids importing moral evaluations 
into the analysis – by not asking ‘why’ or ‘in whose interest’ a state of affairs exists, the impulse 
to say whether that state is good or bad is to some extent mitigated. Such description and 
documentation also allows one to focus on the detail of power and look at what it produces – 
what kinds of self, what kinds of knowledge, what kinds of order – as opposed to simply trying to 
identify what it represses.68 Detailing the ‘what’ rather than the ‘why’ also helps one to avoid the 
temptation to see some techniques as neutral tools positioned outside of power and utilised 
simply to teach students or to ensure that law students can learn effectively. Rather, they can be 
                                                          
63 Dean, above n43 at 187-188; Rose, above n27 at 28; Rose & Miller, above n38 at 185-186. 
64 See, generally, James, ‘Power-Knowledge in Australian Legal Education’, above n19. 
65 Foucault, above n32 at 337. 
66 Foucault, above n32 at 336-337; Dean, above n24 at 39-40; Foucault, ‘Will to Knowledge’, above n33 at 94-95; 
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understood as part of a technical assemblage of power relations. The way in which these practices 
operate and the representations that these bodies of ‘know-how’ provide cannot be understood as 
more enlightened, more appropriate, or more progressive than other practices or discourses – nor 
any less governmental – simply because they claim to be scientific, neutral, or apolitical. 
Despite their apparent coherency, the fact that these practices have existed over time and have 
been used within a variety of different programs, giving effect to diverse rationalities, suggests 
that these practices and knowledges cannot be understood or analysed as a unified bloc directed 
en masse by abstract bodies. Instead, they should be understood as an assemblage69 of practices 
that cannot reflect the will of one individual or group. Hence why critical perspectives perhaps 
overstated the point when suggesting that these practices were part of a wider exercise of power 
by one group, and also why this is an easy claim to criticise. Each practice may be implemented 
to achieve a particular outcome, but result in very different effects than intended.70 For example, 
teaching and assessment methods, such as the lecture or examination, which may produce 
uncritical or unreflective legal graduates, are not implemented simply because the legal 
profession intends to produce graduates in its own image, unable to challenge the social and legal 
status quo (as often suggested by critical legal scholars).71 They may be used because of 
resourcing issues, or because they are effective techniques for teaching and assessing a large 
number of students at once.72 
This leads to an important insight into power – it always encounters resistance. As Rose and 
Miller state, ‘government is a congenitally failing operation’.73 Cataloguing these mundane 
techniques of power allows one to identify the variety of blockages, resistances, and hurdles that 
are encountered within these assemblages, and which stand in the way of programs of 
government being implemented and operating in the manner originally intended. At each point at 
                                                          
69 Dean, above n24 at 40-41. Dean defines an assemblage as ‘…an ensemble of heterogeneous discursive and non-
discursive practices, and regimes of truth and conduct, which possesses an overall coherence without answering to 
any determinative principle or underlying logic’. See Dean, above n43 at 223. 
70 Foucault, ‘Power Affects the Body’, above n33 at 210. 
71 See for example Thornton, above n5 at 78; Charlesworth, above n5 at 30; Simpson & Charlesworth, above n5 at 
106. 
72 See for example Johnstone & Vignaendra, above n12 at 395, 463. 
73 Rose & Miller, above n38 at 190-191. 
24 
 
which power is exercised – that is, when techniques are designed, debated, redesigned, deployed, 
and used in unintended and unforeseen ways – or at each moment that a party interacts with a 
technique – those responsible for its design, the members of the committee that debates its use 
and alters it to align with university policy, the unit coordinators that work to embed that 
technique in a specific component of the course, and the lecturers and tutors that actually employ 
a technique in a classroom – it is amenable to some modification.74 This is why this process is 
referred to as a translation of programs into practice, because they are altered in their passage 
from ideal design to implementation (and even during the implementation) – those involved have 
competing goals, insufficient resources, time, or will, or the designs produced simply cannot 
work effectively in practice.75 
A clear example of this resistance can be seen in assessment regimes, which may not be 
implemented as intended because of resourcing constraints or unanticipated problems – 
academics may not have time to provide extensive feedback to students, or students may not be 
able to adopt that feedback because of a large assessment workload, work commitments, or 
simply because they lack interest.76 This resistance does not necessarily result in the hope of 
critical scholars that power is reversed or ‘overthrown’, but it is important to recognise that such 
resistance exists, as it provides a way of empirically accounting for complexity within power 
relations, and highlights the potential hurdles that those seeking to govern may encounter in that 
process, as well as the points at which power relations may be reversed or modified, even in 
seemingly insignificant ways. This resistance produces further relations of power, such as 
modifications to the way programs are designed, techniques employed, and the ‘conduct of 
conduct’ achieved. In fact, Foucault points to this when he speaks of power as productive and 
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focuses on it at the mundane level, in contrast to other approaches. It is this very possibility of 
resistance that, according to Foucault, signifies power, and not domination.77 
Thus, focusing on the practices of power in this manner allows for different approaches to 
examining legal education scholarship. Instead of suggesting, as critical scholars have previously, 
that legal education consists of indoctrinating and repressive power relations exercised over 
passive students, and instead of assuming, as many pedagogical scholars appear to, that legal 
education is a neutral and benign set of practices, intended to improve and fine-tune the way that 
students learn, an analytics of government foregrounds these activities and practices as forms of 
power. By pointing to the regimes of practices that are assembled in this context – all of the 
mundane techniques that include not only teaching practices, but also forms of evaluation, 
accounting, professional development, assessment, discipline, and self-reflection undertaken by 
teachers, students, and administrators – and considering the manner in which power circulates 
through these practices and how they are assembled and dissembled in a variety of ways to 
achieve numerous, sometimes competing, goals, a picture of power is painted that is altogether 
more complex, less attached to negative connotations, and cognisant of the potential dangers of 
power relations. It is these actors, practices, technologies, and identities that must be mobilised 
and assembled in order to govern. 
 
C The Relations Between Rationalities and Practices 
 
The two methodological signposts outlined here must not be collapsed – the way that government 
is rationalised and designed, and the techniques and practices that are relied on to achieve 
government, must be considered separately. While they are closely related, neither is an 
expression of the other. The rationalities underpinning government guide the operation of 
practices, but these practices are not utilised because of that rationality. Nor are the programs 
designed to give expression to these rationalities put into practice unproblematically, as we have 
seen.78 Analysing rationalities and practices separately makes it possible to account for the large 
gap that can exist between the intentions of governing agencies and the actual practice of 
government. It also avoids the suggestion that the practice of government directly reflects the 
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rationalities underpinning it – that the ‘designs’ of powerful groups are achieved (as per critical 
analyses), or that pedagogically-informed interventions are implemented because of their basis in 
this body of ‘know-how’ (as per pedagogical analyses). 
 
IV POWER AND LEGAL EDUCATION SCHOLARSHIP AFTER GOVERNMENTALITY 
 
It is useful, now, to return to the three assumptions of legal education scholarship discussed 
earlier, and reflect more directly on what the approach presented above offers. Clearly it can 
serve to push past these assumptions. 
Identifying the rationalities and practices of government allows us to consider the first 
assumption – that legal education is neutral and beneficent – differently. Examining the 
rationalities of government allows us to see that the discourses relied on when governing are not 
objective and detached, but very directly shape attempts to govern, and that rationalities 
themselves are linked to addressing problems and conducting conduct. Given Foucault’s work on 
the notion of truth, we cannot easily claim that some practices are inherently good and others are 
bad. There is no basis in truth – of knowledges, of power, or of people – on which this can be 
assessed. For example, there is no essential self here to liberate or respect, nor is there a truthful 
and objective knowledge that can be discovered and used to guide forms of governing. As 
highlighted earlier, we can therefore only explore how values function within rationalities. 
Considering the rationalities of government also allows for the second assumption – that legal 
education is progressive – to be troubled. Charting any changes to the rationalities of government, 
and looking at these rationalities as constituting the field to be governed in thought (as opposed to 
assuming there is an accurate representation ‘out there’ that needs to be respected and which can 
serve as the end point of this progression) allows one to note that any appearance of progression 
is the result of shifting attempts to govern specific problems in new ways. These shifts in 
government are always drawn from authorised discourses, rendered as problems by other 
governing bodies (the State, professional organisations, pedagogical experts, sociologists, 
political activists), and always thwarted in the grubby world of praxis. Practices, too, cannot 
necessarily be labelled progressive or otherwise as already noted – such normative evaluations 
must be suspended if power is to be analysed effectively. They are selected from the limited 
range available to educators and simply taken up and reprogrammed to achieve new ends. Very 
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rarely are practices discarded completely, because in themselves they cannot be considered either 
good or bad. 
Finally, the third assumption – that there is a necessity to government and that it is simply taken-
for-granted that legal educators would adopt a technical role in this government – is also one that 
can be questioned. An analytics of government can show that, indeed, things need not be as they 
are. Forms of government develop in response to a variety of problems that are posed as 
problems to be governed. These problems need not be accepted, and it is not inevitable that they 
would be identified as, or become, a ‘problem’. Recognising rationalities of government can 
bring these to light. Rationalities are contingent and partial, the programs developed from them 
equally so, and the practices mobilised do not operate in intended ways. However, legal 
education scholarship apparently operates as if this government is possible and as if it were 
always beneficial. But this eternal optimism, coupled with the congenital failure of government, 
only produces the conditions for further government.79 
Of course, this is not to suggest that the reporting and discussion of legal education scholarship 
should completely avoid the evaluation of these practices. However, it could be argued that 
reporting and discussion should also reflect on power in the manner suggested here. If legal 
education scholars are to reflect on power effectively, they could place power in the foreground 
and recognise that their eternal optimism is a component of this power – that is, that their 
evaluations of legal education simply add to the intellectual technologies and ‘know-how’ 
mobilised in the activity of governing. To provide a more useful analysis, they could also 
elucidate the representations of students that their interventions rely on, and characterise the 
problems encountered in their implementation as resistance inevitably produced as a part of 
power relations, and not simply as unexpected problems that can be ‘designed out’. In all, it 
would be useful to be explicit about the fact that these are practices of power, and to jettison the 
assumption that they can be reformed and reformulated to a point at which their implementation 
can be achieved untroubled and with all the necessary actors successfully enrolled – with 
everyone ‘on board’, so to speak. 
 
V CONCLUSION 
 
                                                          
79 See further Gavin Kendall & Gary Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods (1999) at 51; Dean, above n24 at 21-23. 
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The ultimate task of this article has been to articulate a potential avenue of further research into 
power and government in the context of legal education that moves away from some of the 
assumptions about these concepts that, it is argued, characterise legal education scholarship. It 
has also sought to encourage new approaches to understanding power in legal education and 
ensure that this constitutes a focus for future research. It is contended that an analytics of 
government offers a more complex, tenable, and ultimately empirically demonstrable account of 
the tangible techniques of power directly operating within this particular regime of practices. 
Diagrams of power relations drawn with the tools outlined here constitute one fruitful way of 
producing such an account. If nothing else, this article has sought to provide an impetus for legal 
education scholars to explore the literature surrounding the concept of governmentality, and 
consider how it might be utilised within legal education research. 
An analytics of government allows for a suspension of the taken-for-granted assumptions about 
legal education currently held by many legal scholars, and can also prevent researchers, as well as 
others intent on intervening in these power relations, from thinking about power in a reductionist 
or determinist manner. For example, through this approach, it is possible to see law schools as not 
simply tools for negative social control in the interests of the legal profession. The legal 
profession need not be characterised as an all-powerful controlling body, nor must the analyses 
provided by critical legal scholars be held up as offering a ‘way out’ of power relations. 
Furthermore, ‘pedagogically appropriate’ teaching methods need not be seen in an unproblematic 
light, and the solutions suggested by pedagogical scholars held up as offering objective 
approaches positioned outside of power relations. As an analytics of government suggests, both 
critical and pedagogical scholarship (and interventions utilising that scholarship) seek to 
implement forms of government and reformulate the regime of practices of legal education in 
specific ways. Disturbing the taken-for-granted assumptions of legal education – primarily by 
positioning legal education as a form of government, and by highlighting the contingency and 
power effects of the rationalities and practices assembled in order to govern – can contribute to 
new forms of reflection regarding how it is possible for legal educators to proceed with their task. 
 
